The two sides agreed that in accordance with the UN Security Council
Resolution 242, the June 4, 1967 lines would be the basis for the
borders between Israel and the State of Palestine. Any modifications
will be calculated from this baseline.
1.1.The West Bank
For the first time both sides presented their own maps of the West Bank.
The maps served as a basis for the discussion on territory and
settlements…The Clinton parameters served as a loose base for the
discussion, but differences of interpretations regarding the scope and
meaning of the parameters emerged. The Palestinian side stated that it
had accepted the Clinton proposal, but with reservations.
The Israeli side stated that the Clinton proposals provided for
annexation of settlement blocs. The Palestinian side did not agree that
the parameters included blocs, and did not accept proposals to annex
blocs. The Palestinian side stated that blocs would cause significant
harm to Palestinian needs and rights, particularly for the Palestinians
residing in areas Israel seeks to annex…The Palestinian side maintained
that since Israel has needs in Palestinian territory, it is responsible
for proposing the necessary border modifications. The Palestinian side
reiterated that such proposals must not adversely affect the
Palestinians' needs and rights.
The Israeli side stated that it did not need to maintain settlements in
the Jordan Valley for security purposes, and its proposed maps reflected
The Israeli maps were principally based on a demographic concept of
settlement blocs incorporating 80% of the settlers. The Israeli side
sketched a map presenting a 6% annexation of the West Bank, the outer
limit of the Clinton proposal. The Palestinian illustrative map
presented 3.1% of the West Bank in the context of a land swap.
Both sides accepted the principle of land swap but the proportionality
of the swap remained under discussion…
The Israeli side requested an additional 2% of land under a lease
agreement to which the Palestinians responded that the subject of lease
could only be discussed after the establishment of a Palestinian state
and the transfer of land to Palestinian sovereignty.
…It was implied that the Gaza Strip would be under total Palestinian
sovereignty…all settlements will be evacuated. The Palestinians claimed
it could be arranged in 6 months, a timetable not agreed by the Israeli
Both sides accepted in principle the Clinton suggestion of having
Palestinian sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods and Israeli sovereignty
over Jewish neighborhoods. The Palestinian side, within the context of a
land swap, affirmed that it was ready to discuss Israeli requests
regarding settlements in East Jerusalem that were constructed after
1967, but not Jebel Abu Ghneim and Ras al-Amud. The Palestinian side
rejected Israeli sovereignty over settlements outside the municipal
borders of Jerusalem, such as Ma'ale Adumim and Givat Ze'ev.
The Palestinian side understood that Israel was ready to accept
Palestinian sovereignty over Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem,
including the entire Muslim, Christian and Armenian quarters of the old
city of Jerusalem, The Israeli side understood that the Palestinians
were willing to accept Israeli sovereignty over the Jewish Quarter of
the Old City and part of the Armenian quarter.
Both sides favored the idea of an Open City…
2.3. Capital for Two States
Both sides accepted that the City of Jerusalem would be the capital of
the two states: Yerushalayim, capital of Israel and Al-Qods, capital of
the State of Palestine.
2.4. Holy/Historical Basin and the Old City
…The Israeli side expressed its interest and raised its concern
regarding the area conceptualized as the Holy Basin (which includes the
Jewish Cemetery on the Mount of Olives, the City of David, Kidron Valley).
The Palestinian side confirmed that it was willing to take into account
Israeli interests and concerns provided that these places remain under
Palestinian sovereignty. Another option for the Holy Basin, suggested
informally by the Israeli side, was to create a special regime or to
suggest some form of internationalization for the entire area or a joint
regime with special cooperation and coordination. The Palestinian side
did not agree to adopt any of these ideas, although the discussion could
2.5. Holy Sites/Western Wall and the Wailing Wall
Both parties have accepted the principle of respective control over each
side's respective holy sites by the two parties (religious control and
management). According to this principle, Israeli control over the
Western Wall would be recognized although there remained a dispute
regarding the area covered by the Wall and especially the link to what
is referred to in Clinton's ideas as "the space sacred to Judaism of
which it is a part."
The Palestinian side acknowledged that Israel has requested to establish
an affiliation to the holy parts of the Western Wall, but given its own
reservations regarding the delineation of the Western/Wailing Wall, this
issue has not been fully resolved.
2.6. Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount
Both sides agreed that the question of Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount has
not been resolved…An informal suggestion was raised that for an agreed
period such as three years, Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount would be under
international sovereignty of the P5 [the five permanent members of the
Security Council] plus Morocco (or another Islamic presence), whereby
the Palestinians would be the "Guardian/Custodians" during this period.
At the end of this period, either the parties would agree on a new
solution or agree to extend the existing arrangement. In the absence of
an agreement, the parties would return to implement the Clinton
formulation. Neither accepted or rejected the suggestion.
Non-papers were exchanged, which were regarded as a good basis for talks…
Both sides suggested, as a basis, that the parties should agree that a
just settlement of the refugee problem in accordance with the UN
Security Council Resolution 242 must lead to the implementation of the
UN General Assembly Resolution 194. Both sides maintained their
respective narratives regarding the essence of UNGAR 194, namely the
right of return versus the wish to return.
The Israeli side put forward a suggested joint narrative for the tragedy
of the Palestinian refuges. The Palestinian side discussed the proposed
narrative and there was much progress, although no agreement concluded.
3.2. Return, Repatriation, and Relocation and Rehabilitation
Both sides engaged in a discussion of the practicalities of resolving
the refugee problem. The Palestinian side reiterated that the
Palestinian refugees shall have the right of return to their homes in
accordance with UNGAR 194. The Israeli side expressed its understanding
that the wish to return as per wording of UNGAR 194 shall be implemented
within the framework of one of the following programs:
A.Return and Repatriation
To Israel swapped territories [Israeli territory transferred to the
Palestinians in a land-swap agreement], which will be over and above
territories discussed in the territorial negotiations
To the Palestinian state
B.Rehabilitation and Relocation
Rehabilitation in a host country
Relocation to a 3rd country
Preference in all of these options shall be accorded to the Palestinian
refugee population in Lebanon.
The Palestinian side stressed that the above shall be subject to the
individual free choice of the refugees…
The Israeli side, informally, suggested a three-track 15-year absorption
program. The first track referred to the absorption to Israel. No
numbers were agreed upon, but with a non-paper referring to 25,000 in
the first 3 years of the program (40,o00 in the first 5 years this
program did not appear in the non-paper but was raised verbally). The
second track referred to the absorption of Palestinian refugees into the
Israeli territory that shall be transferred to Palestinian sovereignty,
and the third track referring to the absorption of refugees in the
context of the family reunification theme.
4.1. Early Warning Signs
The Israeli side requested to have 3 early warning stations on
Palestinian territory. The Palestinian side was prepared to accept the
continued operations of the early warning stations but subject to
certain conditioned. The exact mechanism has therefore to be detailed in
4.2. Military Capacity of the State of Palestine
The Israeli side maintained that the State of Palestine will be
non-militarized as per the Clinton proposals, The Palestinian side was
prepared to accept…[that Palestine] be defined as a state with limited
arms…both sides agree that this issue has not been concluded…
4.4. Timetable for Withdrawal from the West Bank and Jordan Valley
Based on the Clinton proposal, the Israeli side agreed to a withdrawal
from the West Bank over a 36-month period with an additional 36 months
for the Jordan Valley in conjunction with an international force.
The Palestinian side rejected the 36-month withdrawal process expressing
concern that a lengthy process would exacerbate Israeli-Palestinian
tensions. The Palestinian side proposed an 18-month withdrawal under the
supervision of international forces. As to the Jordan Valley the
Palestinian side was prepared to consider the withdrawal of Israeli
armed forces for an additional 10-month period. Although the Palestinian
side was ready to consider the presence of international forces in the
West Bank for a longer period, it refused to accept the ongoing presence
of Israeli force.